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Abstract
This article advances and improves existing post-election audit sampling method-
ology. Methods for determining post-election audit sampling have been the subject of
extensive recent research. This article
• provides an overview of post-election audit sampling research and compares var-
ious approaches to calculating post-election audit sample sizes, focusing on risk-
limiting audits,
• discusses fundamental concepts common to all risk-limiting post-election audits,
presenting new margin error bounds, sampling weights and sampling probabilities
that improve upon existing approaches and work for any size audit unit and for
single or multi-winner election contests,
• provides two new simple formulas for estimating post-election audit sample sizes
in cases when detailed data, expertise, or tools are not available,
• summarizes four improved methods for calculating risk-limiting election audit sam-
ple sizes, showing how to apply precise margin error bounds to improve the accu-
racy and efficacy of existing methods, and
• discusses sampling mistakes that reduce post-election audit effectiveness.
Adequate post-election audit sampling is crucial because analyzing discrepancies
found in too-small samples can determine little except that the sample size is inadequate.
This article is one of three articles in a series Checking Election Outcome Accuracy.
The other two articles discuss post-election auditing procedures and an algorithm for
deciding whether to increase the sample or to certify the election outcome in response
to any discrepancies found during a post-election audit.
1 Introduction
In any field the primary purpose of auditing is to detect incorrect results due to unintended
innocent or deliberate acts by insiders such as administrators or computer programmers.
This article defines “post-election audit” as a check of the accuracy of reported election
results done by manually counting all the voter-verifiable paper ballots associated with
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randomly sampled reported initial vote counts, and checking such additional records as
necessary to ensure the integrity of the electoral process.
“Risk-limiting” post-election audits are election audits that are designed to provide a
minimum high probability that incorrect election initial outcomes are detected and corrected
before the final certification of election results.
Election winners control budgets and contracts worth millions to trillions of dollars, so
this article assumes that election rigging could occur by miscounting the minimum number
of initial reported vote counts that could cause an incorrect election outcome (an incorrect
winner).
Background
In 1975, ahead of his time, Roy Saltman proposed conducting post-election audits using
sample sizes that would detect an amount of miscount that could cause an incorrect elec-
tion outcome, and suggested a formula for estimating the minimum number of miscounted
auditable vote counts that could cause an incorrect election outcome(Saltman, 1975, ap-
pendix B).1
Saltman’s work and the topic of election auditing was largely neglected until more
recently when political scientists, mathematicians, and computer scientists began to recom-
mend that “rather than relying on ad hoc detection and litigation of electoral problems” that
we should “systematically monitor and audit elections in a preventive fashion” (Mebane,
Jr. et al., 2003; Jones, 2004; Dill, 2005; Dopp & Baiman, 2005–2006; Democracy & Man-
agement, 2005; US General Accounting Office, 2005).
By 2006, the US League of Women Voters membership voted to recommended post-
election auditing and the National Institute of Standards and Technology and The US Elec-
tion Assistance Commission’s Technical Guidelines Development Committee recommended
a variety of safeguards for voting systems for the 2007 Voluntary Voting Systems Guidelines
(Project ACCURATE, 2005, pp. 18–20, 40–41), (Rivest & Wack, 2006; Burr et al., 2006;
NIST staff, 2007; Burr, 2007).
In July 2006 Saltman’s formula was re-discovered in a modified form that considers
the possibility of miscounted over and undervotes2 and a numerical computer algorithm
1Saltman calculated the minimum number of minimum miscounted audit units that could cause an incor-
rect election outcome by using the margin as a percentage of votes cast divided by two times a “maximum
level of vote switching that would be undetectable by observation”.
2The newer formula handled over and under-votes by calculating the margin as a percentage out of the
total number of ballots cast, rather than out of votes counted
2
was provided for doing these calculations when vote count size varies (Dopp & Baiman,
2005–2006; Dopp & Stenger, 2006).3 These methods rely on uniform random sampling.
Neff and Wand (Neff, 2003; Wand, 2004) had showed that the smaller the size of
reported vote counts (in number of ballots), the fewer the total number of ballots that need
to be audited to achieve the same probability for detecting the level of vote miscount and
computer scientists proposed sampling individual ballots to make risk-limiting audits more
efficient (Walmsley, 2005; Calandrino et al., 2007b).4 However, most current voting system
tabulators are designed to produce reports only of precinct vote counts, thus making it
difficult to report and to sample small-sized audit units (Dopp, 2009).
Two groups of computer scientists developed weighted sampling methods for post-
election auditing in order to be able to sample fewer ballots yet achieve the same probability
for detecting incorrect outcomes, by targeting ballots having more potential for producing
margin error (Calandrino et al., 2007b; Aslam et al., 2008).
In December 2007, a more precise calculation method for post-election audit sample
sizes and sampling weights was developed by using upper margin error bounds for the just-
winning and just-losing candidate pair(Dopp, 2007–2008c; Aslam et al., 2008; Dopp, 2008),
(Stark, 2008c, p. 13).5
Once sampling weights are determined, fair and efficient methods for making random
selections for audits have been developed (Cordero et al., 2006; Calandrino et al., 2007a;
Aslam et al., 2008; Hall, 2008a; Rivest, 2008) although there is some debate among election
integrity advocates as to which selection methods are preferred, the more understandable
methods such as rolling ten-sided dice, or computer methods such as pseudo-random number
generators that are more efficient and may be more verifiably fair.
Definitions
An “audit unit” or “auditable vote count” is defined in this article as a tally of votes that
is publicly reported for an election contest. This tally is obtained from a group of one or
more ballots that are either:
3However some authors continued to recommend using Saltman’s original method based on the number
of votes counted (McCarthy et al., 2007; Norden et al., 2007b), (Hall, 2008b, Appendix D)
4In other words, risk-limiting election audits require less work for the same benefit when a larger number
of smaller-sized vote counts (audit units) are initially publicly reported and sampled.
5Failure to use accurate within audit unit upper margin error bounds translates to a failure to meet the
assumptions that are used to determine the sample. Within audit unit margin error bounds are used in all
risk-limiting post-election auditing methods for calculating audit sample sizes and sampling weights, and for
analyzing the discrepancies found in the audit.
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• counted at one place and time or
• counted by one voting device, or
• cast by voters who live in the same voting precincts or districts.
Audit units can be precinct vote counts, electronic voting device counts, or batches or decks
of paper ballots. Audit units can be counted by hand or by automatic tabulating equipment
where each tally is associated with a number of ballots maintained as a group. An audit
unit or auditable vote count may be an individual ballot only if the voting system produces
a public report of vote counts on each ballot with humanly readable identifiers for individual
ballots and yet preserves ballot privacy.
An “audit sample size” is the number of audit units that are randomly drawn for
manually counting and comparing with the initial reported audit units.
Under and over-votes are cast ballots eligible to vote in the contest that have no vote
counted on them for any candidate.
Assumptions
For the purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that:
• effective chain of custody and security procedures are used to prevent and detect any
illicit addition, subtraction, substitution, or tampering with ballots and other audit
records, and
• effective procedures are used during a post-election audit so that the manual counts
are therefore accurate, and that when differences are found, at a minimum, recounts
are performed until two counts agree — either the machine and a manual count or
two manual counts.6 See (Deputy Secretary of State Anthony Stevens, 2007; Dopp &
Straight, 2006–2008; Dopp, 2009).
2 Post-Election Auditing Approaches
Three approaches to post-election auditing
The appropriate sample size for conducting post-election audits depends on the audit’s
purpose. Table 1 compares three approaches to checking the accuracy of reported election
results.
6Luther Weeks, in Results of Post-Election Audit of the May 4th Municipal Election
http://www.ctvoterscount.org/?p=2077 suggests that recounts are performed until two counts agree.
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Table 1: Post-Election Auditing Method Comparison
Method Purpose Sample Size Effectiveness
Fixed Rate Audit
To ensure that voting
machines are accurate to
within a specified toler-
ance
A fixed percentage of pub-
licly reported audit units
Effectiveness at detecting
inaccurate initial outcomes
ranges widely
Risk-limiting Audit
To ensure that election
outcomes are accurate
Varies from one (1) to all au-
dit units, as needed to detect
incorrect election outcomes
to a desired probability
Provides roughly equal
probability (e.g., at least
95%) that any incorrect
election outcomes are
detected
Manual Recount
To ensure that all votes
are accurately counted
100% of audit units Provides 100% assurance of
detecting incorrect election
outcomes
If the purpose of an election audit is to ensure that:
• election outcomes are accurately decided, then risk-limiting audits achieve that pur-
pose effectively and efficiently. The risk-limiting post-election audit provides a desired
minimum probability that the audit sample will contain one or more miscounted audit
units whenever the minimum amount of miscount occurred that would cause an initial
incorrect election outcome.
• voting machines have counted election results accurately to within a certain desired
tolerance, then a fixed rate audit is the solution. Fixed rate audits are commonly
used in manufacturing. Fixed rate audits typically use a larger sample in wide margin
election contests, but a smaller sample size in close margin contests than risk-limiting
audits.
• every eligible vote is accurately counted, then a 100% manual audit or recount is the
best solution.
Figures 1 and 2 compare the efficiency and effectiveness of “fixed rate” versus “risk-
limiting” post-election audits using a 500 precinct election contest with 150,000 total ballots
cast and various initial margins.7
Figure 1 shows that 3% fixed rate audits (blue bars) provide unequal probabilities for
detecting the smallest amount of miscount that could cause incorrect outcomes. A 3%
flat rate audit provides very low chance to detect inaccurate outcomes in close contests
7The audit sample sizes for risk-limiting audits in Figures 1 and 2 are calculated using the uniform
estimate method presented later in this article.
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Figure 1: Probability for Detecting Incorrect Election Outcomes
(less than 10% probability in some cases), but provides very high minimum probabilities
(virtually 100% in most cases) for detecting miscount that could cause incorrect outcomes
in wide-margin contests. On the other hand, risk-limiting audits (red bars in Figure 1)
provide roughly equal assurance to all candidates and voters that any outcome-changing
vote miscount is detected and corrected regardless of the winning margins or the number
of precincts.
Figure 2 shows how sample sizes for risk-limiting audits increase as winning margins
decrease. Thus risk-limiting audits could eliminate the need for automatic recounts because
all sufficiently close-margin election contest would automatically receive a 100% manual
count whenever necessary for ensuring that the election outcome were correct. A fixed 3%
audit (blue bars) samples more than is necessary for ensuring the correctness of wide-margin
US House outcomes. In fact, the total overall amount of vote counts that would be audited
nationwide for US House contests would be roughly equal for 3% nationwide fixed rate
audits and for 99% risk-limiting audits.
There are different ways to categorize post-election auditing approaches based on the
sampling approach. Some authors categorize risk-limiting audits that are designed to detect
incorrect election outcomes in a category called “Variable (or Adjustable) Rate Audits”,
along with tiered flat rate audits8 that do not provide any minimum probability for detecting
incorrect election outcomes (Norden et al., 2007b), (Norden et al., 2007a, p. 19), (Hall,
8An example of a “tiered” flat rate audit is the audit proposed by Larry Norden and Representative
Rush Holt, D-NJ that audits 3%, 5%, or 10% of precincts depending on the margin percentage between
the just-winning and just-losing candidate pair. This particular proposal gives as low as a 10% chance of
detecting incorrect outcomes when measured against 2004 US House contest election results.
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Figure 2: Sample Size Comparison
2008b, p. 73). This article categorizes risk-limiting election audits that are designed to
limit the risk of certifying inaccurate election outcomes in a separate category from election
audits that do not limit the risk of certifying incorrect election outcomes to a desired low
probability.
Despite the recent development of risk-limiting post-election auditing methods, most
States have adopted, and some authors continue to recommend fixed rate audits designed
to detect at most certain levels of error (Appel, 1997; Norden et al., 2007b; Norden et al.,
2007a; Atkeson et al., 2008).
3 Risk-limiting Election Audits
The first risk-limiting post-election audit in the US was conducted in Cuyahoga County,
Ohio in 20069 (The Collaborative Audit Committee, 2007; Dopp, 2007a). Since that time
citizen groups in various States are having limited success convincing election officials and
legislators to implement risk-limiting post-election audits, and some have been conducted in
States such as Colorado and California (Stark, 2008b; McBurnett, 2008; Hall et al., 2009).
In January 2009 The League of Women Voters of the United States endorsed risk-limiting
audits, stating that, “The number of audit units to audit should be chosen so as to ensure
there is only a small predetermined chance of confirming an incorrect outcome.” (The
Election Audits Task Force, 2009)
All post-election audit sample sizes and sampling weights are estimates because all
9However, the Cuyahoga County auditors did not correctly analyze the discrepancies found by the audit
based on their sample size design.
7
risk-limiting post-election audit sample sizes and selection weights depend on inputs that
are estimates (such as estimates for the number of miscounted audit units that could cause
an incorrect election outcome or estimates for the amount of maximum possible within
audit unit margin error.) The methods proposed in this article improve upon the accuracy
and conservatism of these estimates.
There is more than one method for calculating risk-limiting post-election audit sample
sizes. Which method is appropriate depends on the answers to questions such as:
• Are initial detailed audit unit and ballot data available for all audit units?
• Is a computer program or spreadsheet available to do the detailed precise calculations?
• Will the random sample be drawn using a uniform probability distribution or by a
weighted sampling method?
• Do we need a quick estimate for planning purposes or the precise audit amount that
achieves at least the desired minimum probability to an detect incorrect outcome?
3.1 Methods common to risk-limiting post-election audits
Maximum level of undetectability
To reduce chances of detection by a post-election audit, a perpetrator might miscount
the smallest number of total audit units possible to cause an incorrect election outcome
(Saltman, 1975; Dopp & Stenger, 2006). However a perpetrator cannot miscount all the
votes within any one audit unit because if all available votes were switched to count for
the perpetrator’s candidate then all voters who had voted for another candidate would
immediately know that the election results were incorrect. Hence, a smart perpetrator
would miscount at most some maximum rate k : 0 < k < 1 of the available margin error.
Thus we assume a maximum level of undetectability k, a maximum rate of margin
error, such that if more margin error than k times the upper margin error bound occurs,
it would look suspicious and cause immediate action by election officials or by candidates
and their supporters.(Saltman, 1975, appendix B)
A risk-limiting audit design assumes that a maximum rate k of the upper margin error
bound within audit units or, for individual ballot audit units, that a maximum rate k
of certain ballot types overall, could be miscounted in favor of an initial winner without
raising immediate suspicion and uses this assumption to estimate a minimum number of
miscounted audit units that could cause an incorrect initial election outcome.
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Table 2: This table contains all the variables used in this article to calculate risk-limiting
election audit sample sizes and sampling weights.
TABLE OF VARIABLES
Variable Name Variable Letter Formula Description
Ballots cast for each audit unit bi
and in total b b =
P
i bi
the total number of ballots cast that are
eligible to vote in the election contest
Votes counted for a
winning candidate
for each audit unit wi
and in total w w =
P
i wi
the total number of votes counted for
the winning candidate
Votes counted for the
just-losing candidate
for each audit unit ri
and in total r r =
P
i ri
the total number of votes counted for
the losing candidate who has the most
initial votes
Votes Counted for Los-
ing Candidates & Un-
der and Over-votes
for each audit unit li
and in total l l =
P
i li
the total number of votes counted
for any losing candidate plus the to-
tal number of ballots with no votes
recorded
Margin
M between a
winning-losing
candidate pair
w − r
=
PN
i=1 wi −
PN
i=1 ri
the difference between the number of
votes counted for a winning candidate
and the number of votes counted for a
losing candidate10
Percentage margin
m M/b
the margin divided by the total number
of ballots cast eligible to vote in the
election contest
Margin error
ei ei = (wi − ri)− (wa − ra)
the difference between the reported ini-
tial margins and the audit margins
Margin error upper
bound
for each audit unit ui
or error bound(i) and
for all audit units E =PN
j=1 error bound(j)
Formula varies, depend-
ing on methods and pur-
pose. Total error bound
is E =
P
i ui
the maximum amount of margin error
in #ballots, within audit units or in
total that could reverse an an election
outcome
Total number of audit
units N
the total number of reported audit
units11 in the contest
Maximum level of Un-
detectability for margin
error
k or MLU a constant k: 0 < k < 1
an assumed maximum rate of margin
error that could occur without raising
enough suspicion to be detected with-
out an audit12
Confidence probability
P Suggest
0.95 ≤ P ≤ 1
See appendix C
the desired minimum probability that
the audit sample will detect one or
more miscounted audit units if an ini-
tial election outcome is incorrect
Audit unit random se-
lection probability pi 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1
the probability that an audit unit will
be randomly selected
The number of mis-
counted audit units C methods vary
See Table 7
the minimum number of miscounted
audit units that could cause an incor-
rect election outcome
Post-election audit
sample size S methods vary
See Table 7
the election audit sample size or num-
ber of audit units to manually count
and compare with reported results
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When audit units contain multiple ballots, then the larger the assumed level of unde-
tectability as k → 1, the fewer the number of miscounted audit units it takes to cause an
incorrect election outcome; and the larger the audit sample size S must be to ensure that
one or more of these potentially miscounted audit units are sampled.13 Similarly, when
individual ballots are the audit units, we still need to multiply the upper margin error
bounds for various types of individual ballots times k : 0 < k < 1 because we assume that
a perpetrator would not target 100% of all ballots with particular votes on them.
A crucial consequence of making a “maximum level of undetectability” assumption
when calculating risk-limiting post-election audit sample sizes is that it necessitates allowing
candidates or their representatives to select one or more suspicious-looking additional audit
units for auditing in addition to randomly selected audit units.
The “maximum level of undetectability” is multiplied times the maximum error avail-
able in each audit unit to get the most error that it is believed could exist without immediate
detection within each audit unit. However, as seen in the next section, some authors use the
actual maximum error, the upper margin error bound, and other authors use an expression
such as the number of votes cast that is an inaccurate measurement for the total possible
error.
The use of an assumed “maximum level of undetectability” necessitates a procedure
of allowing losing candidates to select discretionary audit units to be manually audited at
the same time as the randomly selected audit units. The necessity of auditing additional
discretionary audit units is discussed in section 6 in this article.
One proposed approach is to use 1 or 100% for the maximum level of undetectability
in sample size calculations (Stark, 2008c; Stark, 2008d; Stark, 2008a; Hall et al., 2009).
This would normally result in unnecessarily conservative (large) sample sizes if any of the
methods suggested in this article were used, but the maximum level of undetectability is
in effect canceled from both sides of an inequality involving the ratios of different within
precinct upper margin error bound measures than those recommended herein (Stark, 2009b,
p. 6–10) (Stark, 2009a, p. 4). This cancellation is similar to how the maximum level of un-
detectability cancels when calculating the sampling weights for the probability proportional
to margin error bound with replacement (PPMEBWR) method described below. Assuming
a 100% level of undetectability is of course unreasonable because some voters and candi-
dates would immediately notice the fact that there were zero votes cast in their precincts
13As real-life post-election audits are conducted, more will be learned about what values are most appro-
priate for the maximum level of undetectability k.
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for their candidates. A perpetrator can not expect to steal 100% of available target votes
for his candidate and not be noticed.
Upper margin error bounds
Why are within audit unit upper margin error bounds important?
Within audit unit upper margin error bounds are a crucial input to all calculation
methods for determining post-election audit sample sizes and sampling weights.
Aslam, Popa, and Rivest first derived precise within audit unit upper margin error
bounds for particular winning-losing candidate pairs in an intermediate calculation, but
recommended Saltman’s earlier method of multiplying the maximum level of undetectability,
s = 20%, times two (2) times the number of votes cast, v, to approximate the maximum
undetectable margin error for their sample size calculations.
At about the same time Dopp derived the within audit unit upper margin error bounds,
b + w − r (the number of ballots plus the margin in votes), and applied it to improve the
accuracy of post-election auditing sample size calculations in place of her original recom-
mendation of 2sb where b is the number of ballots cast. Later Stark also recommended
using within audit unit upper margin error bounds, but incorrectly took the maximum of
normalized upper margin bounds of all winning-losing candidate pairs and negated the use
of the upper margin error bounds by employing an arbitrary small level of “acceptable error
t” when calculating sample sizes and analyzing discrepancies.
For risk-limiting audits, when audit units are larger than one ballot, most authors
continue to use or recommend using the less precise expression 2sv for approximating max-
imum undetectable within audit unit margin error (Calandrino et al., 2007b, p. 5), (Aslam
et al., 2008, p. 16), (Saltman, 1975, p. 5 of Appendix B), (McCarthy et al., 2007, p. 6
and Appendix B), (Stanislevic, 2006, pp. 6–10, 15), (Norden et al., 2007a, Appendix B),
(Hall, 2008b, p. 153, Appendix D), (The Election Audits Task Force, 2009, pp. 11, 28–30),
(McBurnett, 2008).
Using less precise margin error bounds can produce insufficient sample sizes and, if used
for sampling weights, can cause the audits to unfairly favor some candidates over others.
For example, using the expression 2sv to approximate margin error:
1. ignores the partisanship of within audit unit vote counts. The partisanship of the vote
counts affect the amount of maximum margin error that can exist between specific
winning-losing candidate pairs and between all winning-losing pairs,
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2. calculates an impossible amount of error when certain vote shares occur — more
than the possible margin error that is available to contribute to causing an incorrect
outcome — in cases when just-losing candidate vote share is high,
3. does not account for the unequal amounts of margin error that results from different
causes such as shifting votes from a winner to a loser or vice-versa, shifting votes
between two different losing candidates or between different winning candidates, and
not counting votes for a losing or winning two candidates. Each miscounted vote may
produce a vote margin error of -2, -1, 0, 1, or 2 in the initial margin for a particular
winning-losing candidate pair. There is no way to express these variations precisely
in terms of votes or ballots cast using an expressions like 2sv or 2sb without making
awkward assumptions about the relative proportions of each type of error (such as
vote-switching between two winners, a winner and a loser, or two losers or simply not
counting votes);
4. by using votes cast, v, fails to consider miscounted under or over-votes (although that
particular problem could be corrected by using ballots cast, b);
5. significantly understates the possible margin error in most cases because actual upper
margin error can be as high as 200% of the number of ballots (Eg. 40% times 0 ≤ s ≤ 1
times the number of cast votes significantly under-states 40% times the amount of
possible within audit unit margin error); and
Thus using 2sv or 2sb as an estimate of maximum error in close margin contests un-
derestimates the sample size, or equivalently over-states the probability for detecting the
minimum level of vote miscount that could cause an incorrect election outcome.14
This article presents two types of precise within audit unit upper margin error bounds
that are should be used when calculating risk-limiting post-election audit sample sizes and
sampling weights:
1. upper margin error bounds for a specific winning-losing candidate pair, and
2. upper margin error bounds for the error that can occur between any candidate pair
Figure 7 in Appendix D graphically compares the 2sv margin error measure with the
actual upper error bounds.
14Dopp compares and contrasts the use of votes cast versus using the actual within audit unit upper
margin error bounds to calculate audit sample sizes in (Dopp, 2007a).
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Upper margin error bounds for specific winning-losing candidate pairs
The margin error between any winning-losing candidate pair is defined as the signed differ-
ence between their initial reported margin and their margin found during a 100% manual
audit. Within each initial audit unit i, let
bi = the number of ballots cast,
wij = the number of initial votes for winning candidate,
lij = the number of initial votes for losing candidate,
waj = the number of audit votes for winning candidate,
laj = the number of audit votes for losing candidate.
Then the margin error within each audit unit i found during the audit between winning-
losing candidate pair j is the difference between the initial margin and the audit margin:
eij = (wij − lij)− (waj − laj)
and in all cases
(wij − lij)− (waj − laj) ≤ bi + wij − lij
because −(waj − laj) ≤ bi
Therefore, authors agree (Dopp, 2007–2008b; Dopp, 2007–2008c; Aslam et al., 2008; Stark,
2008c) that the maximum possible within audit unit initial margin error that could occur
between any winning-losing candidate pair j for each audit unit 1 ≤ i ≤ n is
uij = bi + wij − lij (1)
Note that, in the case of a multi-winner contest and individual ballot audit units, the
expression for the upper margin error that any vote on the ballot could contribute to a
winning-losing candidate pair (wij and lij) reduces to:
bi + wij − lij = 2 if a vote is for winning candidate j,
= 1 if a vote is for another winning candidate,
= 0 if a vote is for losing candidate j,
= 1 if a vote is for another losing candidate,
= 1 if a vote is an over or under-vote
13
The upper margin error bound for that ballot is also zero (0) when all losing candidates
receive votes on the ballot. (Calandrino et al., 2007b, p. 7)
The audit unit upper margin error bound for winning-losing candidate pair j can be
written as a percentage by diving by the number of ballots cast, resulting in the expression
(1 + (wj − lj)/bi)
.
For a simple example of the overall upper margin error, if the initial election results
shows the initial winner has 100 votes and the initial runner-up has 0 votes with no under-
votes or other candidates, but a full manual recount shows that the initial runner-up really
had 100 votes and the initial winner had 0 votes, then the total margin error is 200 =
100 + 100 − 0 votes or 200%.
Example If the winner has 51% of the reported ballots cast and the runner-up has 48%,
then the reported margin is 3%. For the reported winner to be incorrect there must
be at least 3% margin error plus one vote. What is the minimum number of corrupt
vote counts that could cause 3% or more margin error and thus result in an incorrectly
reported election winner? The total possible percentage margin error in this example
contest is 103% if all votes not counted for the runner-up should actually have been
counted for the runner-up, so that the vote share of the runner-up should have been
100% with 0% for all other candidates. The upper margin error bound is thus found
by taking the actual margin minus the reported margin between the winner and the
runner-up or 100% − (−3%) = 103%.
Upper margin error bounds for all winning-losing candidate pairs
Notice that one initial incorrectly recorded vote can contribute margin errors of −2,−1, 0, 1
or 2 votes (See figure 3.1), so that the maximum margin error that any individual vote for
a winning candidate can contribute is 2 votes. One initial incorrect vote for an initial losing
candidate or an under or over-vote can contribute margin errors of −2,−1, 0, or +1 votes,
so that the maximum margin error that an initial vote for a losing candidate can contribute
is 1 vote. Therefore the upper margin error bound for all winning-losing candidate pairs
within each audit unit i is
ui = 2
∑
i
wi +
∑
i
li (2)
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Per Vote Miscount-Caused Margin Error for Candidate Pair A & B
Vote initially re-
ported & counted
for
Vote actually cast for
candidate A candidate B candidate C under or overvote
Initial winning
candidate A
x 2 1 1
Initial losing can-
didate B
–2 x –1 –1
Initial losing can-
didate C
–1 1 x 0
Initial under or
over-vote
–1 1 0 x
Table 3: This table shows all possible error values that one miscounted vote could cause
for the margin between a winning candidate A and a losing candidate B due to vote mis-
allocation in a one-winner (one-seat) contest with three candidates A, B, and C. The
margin error is 2 when a vote is initially counted incorrectly for the winning candidate A
that should have been counted for candidate B; is 1 when a vote is initially reported for
winning candidate A that should have gone to another losing candidate or should have been
an under or over-vote; and is 1 when a vote is initially reported for another losing candidate
or as an under or over-vote that should have been counted for candidate B.
where li is the number of total votes for any losing candidates plus the number of total
under or over-votes (cast ballots eligible to vote in the contest that have no vote counted
for any candidate) and wi is the number of total votes for any winning candidate within
audit unit i.
Note that, in the case of a single-winner contest, when using individual ballot audit
units, the expression for the maximum margin error bound that could contribute to a losing
candidate becoming the actual winner for each winning-losing candidate pair reduces to:
2
∑
i
wi +
∑
i
li = 2 if the vote is for the winning candidate,
= 1 if the vote is for a losing candidate,
= 1 if the vote is an over or under-vote
Note that an equivalent, perhaps simpler, expression for the upper margin error bound
for all winning-losing candidate pairs is simply
ui = bi +
∑
i
wi (3)
where bi is the number of total ballots cast in audit unit i. The formula is equivalent because
the number of ballots includes votes for all winning and losing candidates and under and
15
over-votes, and
∑
iwi doubles the number of votes for the winning candidates.
Calandrino, Halderman, and Felten (Calandrino et al., 2007b) point out that there is
an exception to the above rule. There must be at least one losing candidate not on the
ballot in order for a ballot to contribute any margin error that could cause an incorrect
election outcome. Therefore the upper margin error bound is zero for a ballot in the case
that all losing candidates have votes on a particular ballot because such a ballot can only
contribute negative margin error towards causing an incorrect outcome.
Example Upper Margin Error Bounds in a Wide Margin Contest
2004 Utah State Rep, Dist 3 Vote Counts Upper Margin Error Bnds
Precinct #Ballots Buttars Hurtson Elwell Just-
winning/just-
losing candi-
date margin
error bnds
All candidate
pair margin
error bnds
Totals 13,495 9,614 2,930 236 20,179 23,109
SMI1 871 638 185 11 1,324 1,509
HYD2 996 599 340 16 1,255 1,595
SMI2 819 599 165 15 1,253 1,418
NL04 864 595 222 20 1,237 1,459
NL03 754 553 144 17 1,163 1,307
SMI5 736 543 152 14 1,127 1,279
NLO1 787 512 208 17 1,091 1,299
SMI4 700 510 144 10 1,066 1,210
LO17 699 488 132 13 1,055 1,187
NL02 633 465 108 19 990 1,098
LO25 600 439 93 10 946 1,039
LO04 582 389 138 11 833 971
RCH1 507 390 89 13 808 897
RCH2 503 389 87 9 805 892
LO31 533 368 100 5 801 901
LO30 504 372 84 11 792 876
HYD1 594 381 182 9 793 975
LEW1 490 363 110 4 743 853
SMI3 475 358 94 7 739 833
LEW2 282 227 48 1 461 509
TREN 241 182 48 2 375 423
COVE 202 153 38 2 317 355
CORN 123 101 19 0 205 224
Table 4: The election data and margin error bounds shown above are used to demonstrate
and compare the four methods for calculating risk-limiting post-election audit sample sizes
that are discussed in this paper. The upper margin error bounds for the just-winning-losing
candidate pair and the upper margin error bounds for all candidate pairs are shown here
for the Utah State Representative District # 3 wide-margin contest in the 2004 general
election. Another example of applying all four methods to determine risk-limiting sample
size for a close-margin election contest is shown in an appendix.
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Use the just-winning and just-losing candidate pair to calculate sample sizes
Using accurate sampling weights, any sample size that is sufficient to detect an incorrect
election outcome between the just-winning and just-losing candidate pair will have at least
the same minimum probability for detecting incorrect election outcomes that may have
reversed other winning-losing candidate pairs.15 Therefore post-election audit sample size
calculations only need consider the just-winning and just-losing candidate pair error bounds
and margin.
The reason that the most conservative (largest) overall post-election audit sample size
is calculated by using the winning-losing candidate pair margin error bounds is because
that approach produces the smallest ratio of overall vote margin to the sum of within audit
unit margin error bounds
M
E
where Ej =
∑
i ui is the sum of all upper margin error bounds for winning-losing
candidate pair j over all audit units i and M = w− r is the overall margin. In other words,
the winning-losing candidate pair with the smallest ratio (M/E) is always the just-winning
and justing-losing candidate pair.
M
E
=
w − r∑
i bi + wi − ri
where w is the number of total votes for the winner with the least number of votes and r
is the total number of votes for the losing candidate with the most number of votes (the
runner-up).
A proof of this fact is provided in Appendix E.16
When weighting random selections or analyzing discrepancies consider all
winning-losing candidate pairs
When weighting random selections of audit units or when analyzing discrepancies found
during an audit, focus should probably not be limited to particular initial winning-losing
candidate pairs.
The only type of error that can overcome the winning margin of any winning-losing
candidate pair is margin error that affects that particular candidate pair. The overall total
15Thanks to Calandrino, Halderman, and Felten for coining the phrases “just-winning” and “just-losing”
candidates.
16This finding is contrary to the recommendations of some authors who recommend comparing within
audit unit margin error bounds for all winning-losing candidate pairs at once for each audit unit when
calculating sample sizes and doing discrepancy analysis (Stark, 2008a).
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margin error found during the audit within all audit units separately for each winning-
losing pair, and the maximum within audit unit margin error for all audit units separately
for each winning-losing candidate pair may need consideration when analyzing discrepan-
cies. Discrepancy error for each winning-losing pair may need to be considered, but should
be considered separately for each winning-losing pair over all audit units when analyzing
discrepancies found during an audit.
Table 3.1 shows the election results data and the spreadsheet calculation of within audit
unit upper margin error bounds for a specific election contest, the Utah State Representative
District # 3 wide-margin contest in the 2004 general election. Both the upper margin error
bounds for the just-winning/just-losing candidate pair and for all winning-losing candidate
pairs are shown.
4 Uniform sampling methods
Given the minimum number of miscounted audit units C that could cause an incorrect
outcome, then we can calculate the minimum sample size that is required to give a desired
probability of having at least one such miscounted audit unit by solving the probability
equation for S:
P = 1−
(C
0
)(N−C
S
)
(N
S
)
Therefore, the first step to determine sample sizes for risk-limiting audits that employ
uniform random sampling is to determine the smallest number of miscounted audit units
C, that could cause an incorrect initial election outcome. Then, assuming the presence of
at least C miscounted audit units, the sample is sized to have at least the desired minimum
probability (say 95%+) of including at least one of these C miscounted audit units.
The larger the minimum number of vote counts C that it would take to cause an
incorrect election, the smaller the sample size S is. Thus if C is overestimated, then the
audit sample size may be too small to achieve the desired probability P for detecting
incorrect election outcomes.
Calculate C, the number of miscounted audit units that could cause an
incorrect outcome
Calculations that employ the detailed individual initial vote counts and ballots cast within
each audit unit provide the most accurate sample size by providing the most accurate
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estimate for C, the minimum number of miscounted audit units that could cause an incorrect
outcome. Using the detailed data takes into account the variation upper margin error
bounds that exist within different audit units.
The most accurate estimate for estimating the minimum number of miscounted initial
audit units, C, that could cause an incorrect election outcome is obtained by ordering
all initial audit units in descending order of their upper margin error bounds and then,
beginning with the audit unit with the largest error bound for the just-winning and just-
losing candidate pair, add a fixed proportion (the maximum level of undetectability) times
their upper margin error bounds until there is sufficient error to negate the entire margin
between the just-winning and the just-losing candidate pair. The value of C is the number
of audit units it takes to reach this level of margin error.
A program or a spreadsheet can do the calculations as follows (in pseudo-code):
• Create an array error bound(i) = bi + wi − ri for each auditable vote count i =
0to N − 1
• Sort the error bound() array in descending order (from largest to smallest)
• Find the cumulative maximum possible margin error for the vote count with the
largest error bound, then the two vote counts with the two largest error bounds, etc.
For j = 0 to N − 1,
CumulativeError(j) = error bound(0),∑1
i=0 error bound(i),∑2
i=0 error bound(i)
• At each step compare the cumulative maximum error to the Margin and
if M < k × Cumulative Error(j)
then C ≈ (j + 1) is the minimum number of corrupt vote counts that could cause an
incorrect election outcome and this value of C is used to use to calculate the audit
sample size, S.
This calculation can be performed in a spreadsheet by listing the number of ballots b
and vote counts for the just-winning w and just-losing r candidate pair within each audit
unit, then calculating
bi + wi − ri for i = 0 to N − 1 and ordering the results from largest to smallest.
This method should be used to calculate the sample size prior to making the random
selections.
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Once C is known, we can use our desired probability P , and the number of total audit
units N , we can calculate S the sample size by using an accurate algebraic estimate derived
by Aslam, Popa, and Rivest (Aslam et al., 2007)
S = (N − (C − 1)/2)
(
1− (1− P )1/C
)
or we can find S exactly by using a numerical algorithm as shown by Dopp and Stenger
(Dopp & Stenger, 2006).
See Table 7 for a summary of the uniform method of calculating post-election audit
sample sizes.
Estimate C the number of miscounted audit units that could cause an
incorrect outcome
Alternatively, rough estimates for sample sizes may be obtained for planning purposes such
as for estimating the funds to allocate or the number of vote count auditors that should be
hired, etc.
Estimating the sample size by using the overall initial results, rather than using the
initial detailed vote count (audit unit) data, in effect assumes that all vote counts contain
a uniform amount of margin error. This assumption could over or under-estimate C and
thus over or under-estimate the sample size needed to detect an incorrect initial outcome.
Table 7 summarizes three methods and mechanisms for calculating risk-limiting election
audit sample sizes.
Hence to obtain a rough estimate for the minimum number of audit units that could
cause an incorrect outcome, C, using the overall total results, a more conservative formula
for estimating both C and S is suggested here.
When detailed data or tools and expertise are unavailable that are needed to obtain
more precise estimates, these quick estimates can be made using the overall vote totals and
the number of ballots cast in the largest audit unit in the contest (this can be estimated
from a prior election if it is unavailable):
Cavg =
(w − r)N
k(b+ w − r)
(4)
where Cavg is the minimum number of corrupt audit units that could cause an incorrect
outcome if all audit units have the average upper margin error bound of all audit units, and
C0 =
b
Nb0
Cavg =
b(w − r)
kb0(b+ w − r)
(5)
where C0 is the minimum number of corrupt audit units that could cause an incorrect
outcome if all audit units have the maximum upper margin error bound estimated using b0,
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Example of the Improved Uniform Method & New Uniform Estimation Method
Uniform Sampling Method Uniform Estimation Method
Sample Size 4 —c— 5 ≈ S ≤ 8
min #corrupt AUs 17 12 ≤ C ≈ 20
Precinct kui cumulative margin error
SMI1 529.6 529.6
HYD2 502.0 1,031.6
SMI2 501.2 1,532.8
NL04 494.8 2,027.6
NL03 465.2 2,492
SMI5 450.8 2943.6
NLO1 436.4 3,380.0
SMI4 426.4 3,806.4
LO17 422.0 4,228.4
NL02 396.0 4,624.4
LO25 378.4 5,002.8
LO04 333.2 5,336.0
RCH1 323.2 5,659.2
RCH2 322.0 5,981.2
LO31 320.4 6,301.6
LO30 316.8 6,618.4
HYD1 317.2 6,935.6
LEW1 297.2
SMI3 295.6
LEW2 184.4
TREN 150.0
COVE 126.8
CORN 82.0
Table 5: This table shows the steps for using the improved and new uniform sampling
methods for calculating risk-limiting post-election audit sample sizes as applied to the 2004
Utah State Representative District # 3 wide-margin contest (Data shown in Figure 3.1).
The confidence probability is P = 0.99 and the maximum level of undetectability is k = 0.4.
The prior unimproved uniform method using the old 2svi error bounds calculated a sample
size of only one (1) audit unit for this same contest because it under-estimates the maximum
margin error that could occur within each audit unit.
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the number of ballots cast in the largest audit unit in the contest, where b is the number
of total ballots cast in the contest and N is the total number of audit units in the contest.
See Appendix A for the derivation of equation 4. Equation 5 can simply be derived by
estimating the upper margin error bound of the largest precinct using the number of ballots
cast, assuming its margin is the same as the overall margin, and then solving for the ratio
of Cavg : C0 which always nicely reduces to
Nb0
b
This gives us the relationship C0 ≤ C ≈ Cavg. If C0 ≤ 1 then C = 1. If C0 > 1 then
some further analysis may have to be done to estimate whether C will be closer to the value
of C0 or Cavg.
Using a value of k = 0.40 for estimating the sample size needed to obtain probability
at least P for detecting C corrupt objects out of N objects and then using an estimation
formula for S suggested by Aslam, Popa, and Rivest that sometimes slightly over-estimates
the sample size needed to detect at least one miscounted audit unit if there are C miscounted
units,
S ≈ N
(
1− (1− P )1/Cavg
)
(6)
SCavg ≈ S ≤ SC0 (7)
Substituting the expression for Cavg into the formula for S, and combining we get
S ≈ SCavg = N
(
1− (1− P )k(b+w−r)/(N(w−r))
)
(8)
and substituting the expression for C0 into the formula for S, and combining we get
S ≤ SC0 = N
(
1− (1− P )kb0(b+w−r)/(b(w−r))
)
(9)
See Appendix A for the derivation of Equation 8 and Appendix B for the derivation of
Equation 6.
Other methods to estimate risk-based post-election audit sample sizes from overall
initial election results can be developed using the pattern of upper margin error bounds
found in prior elections’ audit units. Such methods are specific to patterns found in specific
election jurisdictions.
Using Formula 8 and 9 to estimate post-election audit sample sizes is simply done by
using the following steps
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1. Select a desired probability, P , for detecting the minimum level of miscount that could
cause an incorrect election outcome. (A value P ≥ 0.95 is suggested).
2. Select an assumed maximum rate of undetectability that it is believed would not be
immediately noticed if it occurs. (An initial value k ≥ 0.40 is suggested.)
3. Estimate the minimum number of miscounted audit units, Cavg, that could cause an
incorrect election outcome
Cavg = (N ∗ (w − r))/((k ∗ (b+ w − r))
4. Calculate S ≈ N
(
1− (1− P )1/Cavg
)
using a spreadsheet or a calculator.
It only takes one row and five columns in a spreadsheet to estimate the risk-limiting
post-election audit sample size for various election contests using this new formula.17
5 Weighted sampling methods
When random selections are weighted by margin error bounds, the probability proportional
to margin error bound (PPMEB) method can be used to determine the risk-limiting election
audit sample size (Aslam et al., 2008; Dopp & Straight, 2006–2008; Dopp, 2007–2008a;
Calandrino et al., 2007b; Dopp, 2007–2008c).
Probability proportional to margin error bound methods for post-election auditing re-
duce the post-election audit sample size necessary to achieve a desired detection probability
by weighting the selections of audit units using the audit unit margin error bounds (Aslam
et al., 2008, p.10 and 16), (Dopp, 2007–2008a; Dopp, 2007–2008c; Calandrino et al., 2007b).
This article proposes new weights and probabilities for randomly selecting audit units
that will work well for both individual ballot audit units proposed by Calandrino, Halder-
man, and Felten and for variable sized audit units proposed by Aslam, Popa, and Rivest
(Aslam et al., 2008; Calandrino et al., 2007b).
In calculating the random sampling weights and probabilities, it is probably best to
avoid making assumptions about which initial winning-losing candidate pair could be incor-
rect. Thus the upper margin error bounds that each ballot could contribute to margin error
for any winning-losing candidate pairs should be considered developing sampling weights.
17A spreadsheet formula for calculating C, the number of corrupt counts that could cause an incorrect
election outcome is
‘‘=(N*(w-r))/(k*(b+w-r))’’. A spreadsheet formula for calculating S, the audit sample size needed to
provide P , probability for detecting one or more corrupt vote counts if there are C corrupt vote counts is
‘‘=N*(1-(1-P)^(1/C))’’.
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To ensure the most conservative approach (to ensure an adequate sample size), the
margin in total ballots to be overcome is still the margin between the initial just-winning
and the just-losing candidate pair.
This method applies equally well to any size audit unit and to election contests with
any number of seats being elected. The sample size is calculated from the probabilities that
each audit unit is randomly selected.
Appendix D describes some flaws with the upper margin error bounds and the sampling
weights proposed in some other authors’ recommendations.
Calculate the random selection weights
Note that each initial losing candidate j would certainly prefer that the sampling weights
used to select audit units are the losing candidate’s own upper margin error bounds with
an initial winning candidate as follows:
ui = bi + wij − lij
because then initial votes cast for that particular losing candidate would tend to escape
scrutiny, while votes of other candidates would receive more scrutiny.
However, in order to provide equal treatment to all losing candidates when weighting
random selections, we avoid using upper margin error bounds for particular winning-losing
candidate pairs and thus avoid any assumption about which initial winning-losing candidate
pair(s) are incorrectly reported.
If a perpetrator with good insider access knows that the just-winning and just-losing
upper margin error bounds are used to weight selections, that could provide a strategy
to hide miscount by repositioning the relative order of candidate vote totals. In other
words, a perpetrator could try to cause the initial results to show a different ordering of the
candidates to reduce the chances of scrutiny of certain candidates’ votes.
Hence we need a within audit unit upper margin error bound for all winning-losing
candidate pairs for weighting random samples.
Not that there may be exceptions to this rule when auditors are increasing an audit
sample in response to detecting errors in certain candidates’ votes and believe that certain
candidates’ votes need the most scrutiny.
The selection weights for audit units suggested here allow for the possibility that any
initial losing candidate might be a rightful winner, and any initial winning candidate could
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be a rightful losing candidate by using the upper margin error bounds for each audit unit
i of:
ui = 2
∑
i
wi +
∑
i
li (10)
where
li = the number of votes for any losing candidates
& under-over-votes,
wi = the number of votes for any winning candidate,
w − r = the overall initial margin of just-winning and
just-losing candidate pair.
See Appendix F for an example showing how this maximum amount of margin error
could occur within an audit unit.
Another benefit of this method is that if there is more than one winner in a multi-
seat election, the sampling weights suggested here do not assume which winner may be
an incorrect winner, and do not assume which initial losing candidate may be a rightful
winning candidate.
This weighted sampling proposal is consistent with the amount of upper margin error
that each ballot can contribute to causing an incorrect outcome, given that we do not known
which initial winning-losing candidate pair may be incorrect before auditing.
5.1 The Improved PPMEB Method
Probability proportional to margin error bound (PPMEB) methods use margin error bounds
for sampling weights.
One PPMEB method for sampling individual ballots looks at how many of each par-
ticular type of audit unit with its own particular voting patterns could be used to cause
an incorrect election outcome (Calandrino et al., 2007b). This section suggests using new
more accurate sampling weights for the approach first developed by Calandrino et al. and
generalizes the method to any size audit unit.18
Using this improved method, the fewest number of such miscounted audit units that
18Appendix D explains why the original method proposed by Calandrino et al. for random selection weights
do not work as well as the improved method presented in this paper.
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could possibly cause an incorrect election outcome for each type of audit unit 1 ≤ i ≤ n is:
ci ≈
(w − r)
k(2
∑
iw +
∑
i l)
(11)
ci is an estimate for the number of similar audit units it would take to alter the election
outcome by taking the maximum reasonable proportion of the over margin between the just-
winning and just-losing candidate pair that could be eaten up by miscounted ballots with
this vote pattern without raising immediate suspicion.
Therefore, the probability that each audit unit (individual ballot)
1 ≤ i ≤ n should be selected for auditing is:
pi = 1− (1− P )
1/ciand substituting for 1/ci we get (12)
pi = 1− (1− P )
k(2
P
i wi+
P
i li)/((w−r)) (13)
where within each audit unit,
li = the number of votes for losing candidates
& under & over-votes,
wi = the number of votes for any winning candidate,
w − r = the overall initial margin of just-winning,
just-losing candidate pair, and
k = the assumed maximum level of undetectability.
The sample size
The expected value for the overall post-election audit sample size is equal to the sum of the
probabilities that each audit unit is selected for auditing:
∑
i
pi =
∑
i
(1− (1− P )k(2
P
i wi+
P
i li)/(w−r)) (14)
5.2 The Improved PPMEBWR Method
Another PPMEB approach looks at how much each audit unit could contribute overall
to causing an incorrect election outcome. The probability proportional to margin error
bound with replacement (PPMEBWR) approach was first developed by Aslam, Popa, and
Rivest.(Aslam et al., 2008, p. 16)
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This section improves upon the method recommended by Aslam et al. by using the
more precise just-winning/just-losing candidate pair upper margin error bounds to calculate
the number of random draws and by using the new all-candidate-pair sampling weights
presented here to calculate the sampling weights for the PPMEBWR method.19
Overall the PPMEBWR method is simply described as follows:
The number of random draws t with replacement of audit units is
t = ln(1− P )/ ln(1−M/Ewr)
where M is the overall vote margin for the just-winning and just-losing candidate pair,
and Ewr = k
∑
ui, the maximum level of undetectability k times the sum of the within
audit unit upper margin error bounds for the just-winning and just-losing candidate pair.
In other words, Ewr = k
∑
i (bi + wi − ri) where bi is the total number of ballots cast, wi
is the number of initial votes counted for the just-winning candidate, and ri is the number
of initial votes reported for the just-losing candidate in audit unit i, and where P is the
desired probability that there is at least one miscounted audit unit in the sample if the
initial reported election outcome is incorrect. Ewr simply reduces to Ewr = k(b + w − r)
or k times the total number of ballots + total votes for the just-winning candidate minus
the total votes for the just-losing candidate in the contest because k
∑
i (bi + wi − ri) =
k(
∑
bi +
∑
wi −
∑
ri).
So, as not to bias the sample in favor of a particular initial reported losing candidate
over another, the probability pi for sampling each audit unit i = 1 to i = N is
pi =
2
∑
ij wij +
∑
ij lij
Ea
pi =
bi +
∑
ij wij
Ea
where the sum of margin error bounds is Ea =
∑
i (2
∑
ij wij +
∑
ij lij) the sum of the upper
margin error bounds for all winning-losing candidate pairs, and where the number of votes
for winning candidates j in audit unit i is wij and the number of votes for losing candidates
j and under-votes in audit unit i is lij.
First step: Sum the total error bounds
The first step is to calculate Ewr = k
∑
i (bi + wi − ri) the sum of the error bounds for the
i = 1 to i = N audit units for the just-winning and just-losing candidate pair. We multiply
19 Appendix D explains why the original Aslam et al. upper margin error bounds and random selection
weights do not obtain the stated probability for detecting incorrect election outcomes.
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the upper error bounds times k, the maximum level of undetectability where 0 ≤ k ≤ 1
as discussed above because not all ballots can be miscounted or it would be immediately
evident without an audit. This sum can be easily calculated by adding the total number
of ballots cast in the election contest, plus the total number of initial votes counted for the
just-winning candidate, minus the total number of initial votes counted for the just-losing
candidate.
Also calculate Ea =
∑
i (2
∑
ij wij +
∑
ij lij) the sum of the upper margin error bounds
for all winning-losing candidate pairs for the i = 1 to i = N audit units by summing two
times the total initial votes counted for any winning candidate plus the total initial votes
counted for any losing candidate.
Second step: Calculate the number of draws
Calculate t using the margin in ballots between the just-winning and just-losing candidate
pair, M = w−r, and E, and P the desired confidence probability that there will be at least
one miscounted audit unit in our sample if the initial election outcome is incorrect.
t = ln(1− P )/ ln(1−M/Ewr) (15)
The derivation for the number of draws for the weighted sampling method is described in
previous literature.(Aslam et al., 2008, p. 10), (Dopp, 2007–2008a).
Third step: Calculate the selection weights
Now calculate the sampling weights for each of the i = 1 to i = N audit units.
pi =
2
∑
ij wij +
∑
ij lij
Ea
orpi =
bi +
∑
ij wij
Ea
or
using the upper margin error bounds for all candidates in audit unit i as shown in
equation 10.
The expected value for the sample size S will be:
S =
∑
i
(1− (1− pi)
t)
6 Other Sample Size Considerations
Losing candidates select additional audit units
To achieve the desired minimum probability for detecting incorrect election outcomes, due
to the use of the assumption of a maximum level of undetectability, k, we must allow losing
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Example applying the Improved Weighted Sampling Methods
Improved PPMEB approach Improved PPMEBWR approach
Expected Sample Size 6 3
#Draws 3
Precinct ci pi pi 1− (1− p)
t
SMI1 11.07 0.34 0.07 0.18
HYD2 10.48 0.36 0.07 0.19
SMI2 11.78 0.32 0.06 0.17
NL04 11.45 0.33 0.06 0.18
NL03 12.79 0.30 0.06 0.16
SMI5 13.06 0.30 0.06 0.16
NLO1 12.86 0.30 0.06 0.16
SMI4 13.81 0.28 0.05 0.15
LO17 14.08 0.28 0.05 0.15
NL02 15.22 0.26 0.05 0.14
LO25 16.08 0.25 0.04 0.13
LO04 17.21 0.23 0.04 0.12
RCH1 18.63 0.22 0.04 0.11
RCH2 18.73 0.22 0.04 0.11
LO31 18.55 0.22 0.04 0.11
LO30 19.08 0.21 0.04 0.11
HYD1 17.14 0.24 0.04 0.12
LEW1 19.59 0.21 0.04 0.11
SMI3 20.06 0.21 0.04 0.10
LEW2 32.83 0.13 0.02 0.06
TREN 39.50 0.11 0.02 0.05
COVE 47.07 0.09 0.01 0.05
CORN 74.6 0.06 0.0 0.03
Table 6: This table shows the steps for using the improved weighted sampling methods
for risk-limiting post-election audits applied to the 2004 Utah State Representative District
# 3 wide-margin contest (data shown in Table 3.1). This example uses a confidence prob-
ability of P = 0.99 and a maximum level of undetectability of k = 0.4. In this case, the
improved PPMEBWR method shows an expected sample size of 3 audit units versus the
old PPMEBR method that used the 2sv error bound that would have calculated a sample
size of only 1 audit unit. The improved PPMEB method is more conservative than the
improved PPMEBWR method with an expected sample size of 6 audit units.
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Table 7: Summary of Improved Methods for Risk-Reducing Post-Election Audit Sampling
Random Selection Method
Data & Tools Available? Uniform Probability Distribution Probability Proportional to
Margin Error Bound (PP-
MEB)
Detailed initial audit
unit (vote count) data
and a spreadsheet or
computer program are
available
For each vote count i
error boundwr(i) = k(wi − ri + bi)
where 0.4 ≤ k ≤ 1 for the
just-winning/just-losing candidate pair.
Order error bound in descending size
order. Then for each j from 0 to N − 1, if
w − r <
Pj
i=0 error bound(i) then stop
and C = j + i. Then the sample size S
can be found for detecting C corrupt
audit units using a precise numerical
method (Dopp & Stenger, 2006) or by
using an estimate (Aslam et al., 2007)
S = (N − (C − 1)/2)
“
1− (1− P )1/C
”
PPMEB METHOD
If miscounted, each audit unit i
with a particular vote pattern
would take approximately at most
ci ≈
(w−r)
k(bi+
P
i w)
of such units to
overcome the closest contest
margin. So select each audit unit
with probability
pi = 1− (1− P )
1/ci
The expected value for the sample
size is
S =
P
i pi
PPMEBWR METHOD
Ewr = k(b+w − r) the sum of k
times the upper margin error
bounds for the
just-winning/just-losing candidate
pair.
For each audit unit i
error bounda(i) = bi +
P
ij wij
where
Ea =
PN−1
i=0 error bounda(i) is the
sum of bounds for all
winning-losing candidate pairs.
The selection probability for each
audit unit is
pi =
error bounda(i)
Ea
The number of
selection rounds is
t = ln(1− P )/ ln(1−M/Ewr) and
the expected sample size is
S =
P
i(1− (1− pi)
t)
Overall, but not de-
tailed, election results
data are available
Estimate the number of corrupt vote
counts to cause an incorrect election
outcome
Cavg = ((w − r)N)/(k(b+ w − r))
C0 =
b
Nb0
Cavg
then the sample size is between these two
values
N
“
1− (1− P )1/Cavg
”
≤ S ≤
N
“
1− (1− P )1/C0
”
where 0.5 ≤ k ≤ 1.
See Appendices A & B for more informa-
tion.
Not possible
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candidates or their representatives to select at least one additional discretionary audit unit
to supplement the randomly-selected sample. Discretionary audit units are necessary due
to basing random sample sizes on the assumption that suspicious-looking audit units with
more than a fixed level of margin error k, say 40% or 50%, would be investigated without
the necessity for an audit (Dopp & Stenger, 2006, p. 14), (Dopp & Straight, 2006–2008),
(Dopp, 2007–2008b), (Stark, 2008d, p. 7), (Appel, 1997; Hall, 2008b).
This crucial practice would be thwarted if the losing candidates were required to pay
the costs of any discretionary audits and if these discretionary audits were separately ad-
ministered. Risk-limiting election audits that do not allow for the selection of discretionary
audit units over-state the confidence probability that the audit will detect incorrect out-
comes because they in essence put no upper limit on the margin error that could occur
within audit units, negating the assumptions of their own sample size calculations.
Discretionary audit units should be included as part of the initial manual audit without
cost to candidates, or a risk-limiting audit may fail to achieve its stated minimum probability
to detect erroneous initial outcomes.
Select one additional audit unit from each “missed” jurisdiction
Unless at least one audit unit is sampled from each separately administered election juris-
diction where an election contest occurs, innocent ballot programming errors, voting system
problems, or fraud that is peculiar to one jurisdiction could be missed. It is important to
make these additional random selections only after the initial random selections are made
from any missed jurisdictions because otherwise audits would insufficiently sample high-
population areas, thus providing a map for potential perpetrators for what areas to target
in order to increase the chance that audits would not detect the miscount.20
Size audit units as uniformly as possible
It is important to keep the size variation of auditable vote counts as small as possible for
two reasons:
1. Wide variation in the number of ballots cast (and the margin error available) in
different audit units can result in sufficient margin error to cause an incorrect election
outcome existing in just a few of the largest audit units. Especially if uniform sampling
methods are used (as unfortunately is required by some state’s auditing statutes)
20Attorney Paul Lehto pointed this out in emails.
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outcome-altering error may be missed and wide variation in audit unit sizes increases
the need for manually counting more ballots.
2. Risk-limiting audits can be conducted more efficiently if the total number of ballots
in all audit units is roughly uniform by evening out within audit unit margin error
potential somewhat. To achieve the same risk level, it requires manually counting
fewer audit units overall when the audit unit sizes are more uniform.21
Small-sized audit units are more efficient
The smaller the number of total ballots in the reported audit units, the fewer the number
of ballots overall will need to be manually audited to provide the desired probability for
detecting incorrect outcomes ((Wand, 2004; Walmsley, 2005; Atkeson et al., 2008)).
Voting system design and procedural obstacles to conducting effective, efficient audits
because today almost all commercial voting system tabulators are designed to only report
precinct vote counts and do not report which machines tallied those votes and do not report
tallies for ballots that are counted and stored together. These design flaws make precincts
or polling places the only audit unit that election officials can conveniently use for auditing
election results accuracy without taking time-consuming extra measures that delay the
tallying and public release of initial election results just at the time when candidates and
press are anxiously waiting for results (Dopp, 2009).
Election officials may wait to begin a post-election audit after all provisional and mail-in
ballots have been counted and publicly reported, or alternatively officials could use some-
what inconvenient, time-consuming ways to count and to publicly report mail-in and provi-
sional ballots in batches that are roughly equal in size to the median or average-sized audit
units. See the upcoming article in this same series Checking Election Outcome Accuracy —
Post-Election Audit Procedures.
Some errors to avoid
Some authors state that risk-limiting post-election audits can be performed using any initial
sample size (Stark, 2008c, p. 18), (Stark, 2009a; Hall et al., 2009). However, audits that
use insufficient initial sample sizes are either ineffective or inefficient — Ineffective because
insufficient initial samples are not likely to detect well-hidden vote fraud in cases when
21With large size variation of vote counts the Uniform method for estimating sample sizes without detailed
data will underestimate the sample size needed to achieve the desired probability of detecting incorrect
outcomes, and thus under-states the maximum risk level for a calculated sample size.
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a minimum number of audit units are miscounted to cause an incorrect outcome and yet
avoid a state-mandated recount; and inefficient and administratively burdensome because
even if no discrepancies are found in a too-small sample, limiting the risk requires manually
auditing another round of randomly selected audit units.
Because keeping w−r constant and decreasing E increases the quantity M/E and thus
decreases the post-election audit sample sizes, procedures that:
1. take minimums of within audit unit upper margin error bounds out of all the winning-
losing pairs produce an insufficient sample size,
2. take minimums of values that are less than the margin error bounds for the just-
winning and just-losing candidate pair when calculating the total upper margin error
bound E, produce an insufficient sample size,
3. use proportions of total votes or of total ballots to approximate the total upper margin
error bound E (such as
∑
2sivi) that are more often less but sometimes more than
the actual margin error bounds produce insufficient sample sizes and poor sampling
weights. (See Appendix D for a discussion.)
Methods that produce insufficient sample sizes will not achieve their stated minimum
probability for detecting vote fraud that occurs by miscounting a minimum number of
audit units to cause an incorrect outcome, unless the audit sample is expanded even when
no discrepancies are found in the initial sample.
Failure to use and to understand the logical implications of using a maximum level of
undetectability of less than one (1) in any of the methods described in this paper can cause:
• a test result that says to expand an audit sample unnecessarily, in some cases even
after a 100% manual count has already been performed; and
• an unmerited expansion of the sample size when there is only a one ballot discrep-
ancy. (Stark, 2009b, p. 6–9)
When calculating sample sizes, sampling weights, or analyzing discrepancies, methods
that use a different winning-losing candidate pair’s margin error bound for each different
audit unit or even mix up the data for different election contests into one calculation method
(Stark, 2008c; Stark, 2008d; Stark, 2009a; Hall et al., 2009) are less precise. Such methodol-
ogy does not save significant computation time or resources because the data and resources
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used to do more precise calculations are about the same. The sum or maximum of within au-
dit unit upper margin error bounds for each winning-losing candidate pair separately could
just as easily and more accurately be calculated for one election contest at a time, and
then that sum or maximum compared with those of other winning-losing candidate pairs
for each separate election contest. The method of mixing up multiple election contests into
one calculation will initially over-audit some contests and under-audit others, making the
discrepancy analysis conclusions less efficient for some contests and less precise, possibly
causing unnecessary false positives or failures to detect some incorrect election outcomes.
Also trying to manually count multiple contests on the same ballot at the same time during
an audit, is likely to negate the efficiencies of using the sort and stack method for counting
paper ballots (Deputy Secretary of State Anthony Stevens, 2007).
All election contests require a sample size larger than zero (0). In fact the formula given
to show that in some cases a post-election audit is not required to confirm an outcome (Stark,
2008c, p. 10), (Stark, 2009b, p. 6) can be instead be used to prove that in any contest with
more than one candidate, the sample size must be greater than zero to confirm the outcome
because winning candidates have more initial reported votes than losing candidates.
7 Summary & Recommendations
Risk-limiting post-election audits limit the risk that an incorrect election outcome, the
wrong winner, is incorrectly certified to any desired small maximum probability.22 Table 7
summarizes the improved methods presented in this paper for calculating post-election
audit sample sizes and for weighting random selections that ensure that post-election audits
achieve the desired minimum probability of detecting and correcting any incorrect initial
outcomes.
The new upper margin error bounds for all winning-losing candidate pairs that are pre-
sented in this article improve the sample size calculations and sampling weights of existing
approaches and work for any size (1-ballot or many-ballot) audit units, for single or multi-
winner election contests and for approaches treating all losing candidates equally. Using
precisely correct upper margin error bounds ensures the adequacy of post-election audit
sample sizes and allows random selection weights focusing on all winning-losing candidate
22Risk-limiting audits should limit risk of incorrect outcomes even in cases where there are a large number
of under-votes. In the 2006 Sarasota County, Florida Congressional District 13 race, there were 18,000
missing votes (undervotes) in a Democratic-leaning county recorded on paperless ES&S DREs in a tight
election. Statistics show that these undervotes probably altered the outcome, causing Christine Jennings to
lose the US House race.
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pairs or on a particular winning-losing candidate pair.
When weighting random selections, this author recommends using the more conserva-
tive PPMEB method that uses a larger post-election audit sample size. Both the PPMEB
and the PPMEBWR weighted sampling methods can be generalized for any sized audit
units (from 1 ballot to many ballots) using the improved methods suggested in this paper.
Methods and materials for auditing elections and training auditors still need develop-
ment. Election officials, vote count auditors, election integrity advocates, and voting system
vendors, would benefit from
• Better voting system design specifications and technical features would make voting
machines and tabulators more audit-able and accountable, provide more convenient
methods to check vote count accuracy and to determine how, when, and where errors
occur and the cause of errors.
• An accurate, understandable post-election auditing manual and an easy-to-use tool-
kit that includes a clear explanation of and a program for calculating risk-limiting
election audit sample sizes, including procedures for conducting effective and efficient
post-election audits. This manual should provide pictures, forms and toolkits; and
explain election auditing in simple-to-follow terms for lay persons23.
• Use of open publicly defined computer data recording format standards uniformly
adopted by all election districts to provide consistent access to all electronic bal-
lot records and making voting system components, including auditing devices, inter-
operable24.
• Conferences that bring together experts in election auditing methods together with
State and county election officials and State and Federal legislators.
• Clear, easy-to-follow instructions and computer programs for making verifiable fair,
weighted or uniform random selections of audit units.
• Methods to generate audit vote fraud and discrepancy test data to test the ability of
various audit methods’ to detect various vote fraud strategies.
23In order to be successful, so that election jurisdictions do not have to hire statisticians to plan every
post-election risk-limiting audit, such a project would require professional manual writers, and open source
computer program developers, to create an easy-to-use manual and tool-kit in collaboration with election
officials, security experts, and election auditing experts.
24To date only the Secretary of State office in California has reported precinct level election results using
international recording standards.
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• A complete set of methods, tools, and decision-making algorithms for analyzing post-
election audit discrepancies, including algorithms for deciding whether to certify an
election outcome or to expand the audit sample.25
• The development of precise methods to assist losing candidates in selecting discre-
tionary “suspicious-looking” audit units to add to the randomly selected sample.
• A college textbook or textbook chapter to explain post-election auditing methodology
and principles.
The knowledge, resources and skills needed to implement routine post-election risk-
limiting audits that provide high confidence in the accuracy of final election outcomes need
on-going development and dissemination.
There are two other articles in this series Checking Election Outcome Accuracy —
Post-Election Audit Discrepancy Analysis, and Checking Election Outcome Accuracy —
Post-Election Audit Procedures.
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Appendix A: Derivation of Estimate for the Minimum Num-
ber of Corrupt Vote Counts to Alter an Outcome
The smallest amount of margin error that could change the reported outcome is the actual
margin in ballots between the winning candidate with the smallest number of votes (the just-
winning candidate) and the losing candidate with the most votes (the just-losing candidate).
The upper bound for margin error
The upper bound in number of ballots for the total margin error that could contribute to
an incorrect election outcome is given by the expression b + w − r, or as a percentage of
ballots, is 1 + w−rb , where b is the total number of ballots cast in the election contest, w is
the reported number of votes counted for the winner, and r is the number of reported votes
counted for the closest runner-up.
Estimating the minimum number of corrupt vote counts, C that could
cause an incorrect outcome
Cavg, the estimate if margin error bounds were all average sized
One way to estimate the minimum number of corrupt audit units, C, that could cause an
incorrect winner, is to divide the margin in ballots between the just-winning and just-losing
candidates by the average upper margin error bound for all the reported vote counts. This
gives a measure for how many corrupt audit units could cause an incorrect election outcome
if all audit units have the average upper margin error bounds.
TotalMarginError2ChangeOutcome
AverageMarginErrorPerAuditUnit
= #AuditUnits2ChangeOutcome
This estimates the number of audit units with sufficient possible margin error to cause
an incorrect election outcome.
Thus, this estimate for Cavg is
Cavg ≈
w − r
k(b+w−r)
N
which reduces to
Cavg ≈
N(w − r)
k(b+ w − r)
However, this method usually underestimates C in real elections because the average amount
of margin error in all audit units is always less than the amount of possible margin error
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in the largest audit units. Hence using a larger k value such as k ≥ 0.50 will help to
compensate by finding a more conservative estimate (larger sample size) for S.
C0, the most (overly) conservative estimate
From the above formula for Cavgand some estimates for the reported margin in the largest
audit unit, a formula can be derived and simplified that provides a more conservative
(smaller) estimate for the number of corrupt audit units C0 and thus provides a more
conservative (larger) sample size estimate.
Simply use the relationship that
C0 ≈
bCavg
Nb0
where b0 is the number of ballots in the
largest audit unit with the most ballots cast
This estimate assumes that the margin in the largest audit unit is the same as the
overall margin in the election contest. That is, the margin error bound in the largest audit
unit is b0(1 + (w − r)/b) so that the ratio of the margin error in the largest audit unit to
the audit unit with average margin error algebraically reduces to Nb0/b.
Appendix B: Derivation of a Uniform Election Audit Sample
Size Estimate
This derivation has been previously described elsewhere (Rivest, 2007; Dopp, 2007b). Two
well-known mathematical facts are used in the derivation:
1. For values of 0 < c < 1, (1 − c) ≈ e−c so that (1 − c)S ≈ e−cS and therefore taking
the natural log of both sides ln(1− c)S ≈ −cS;
2. The formula for estimating the number of distinct elements, S, in a sample of size t
drawn (with replacement) from a set of size N is S ≈ N(1− e)−t/N .
We begin with N total vote counts, of which C are corrupt (miscounted) and ask what
randomly selected sample size S will give us at least probability P for having one or more
corrupt vote counts. Estimating the desired probability from sampling with replacement
(an easier equation to solve than sampling without replacement), we find the probability of
not detecting any miscount. Because, P (0) + P (1) + · · ·+ P (S) = 1 and S ≤ C,
then the probability of drawing one or more corrupt vote counts is
P (1) + P (2) + · · · + P (S) = 1− P (0).
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If we randomly draw one vote count, then the chance of drawing a corrupt vote count
is C/N and the chance of not drawing a corrupt precinct,
P (0) =
N − C
N
so that
P (0) = 1−
C
N
.
If we sample with replacement (each draw is an independent event) then the probability
of drawing no corrupt precincts in S draws is
(
1−
C
N
)S
and thus the probability of drawing one or more corrupt vote counts is
P = 1−
(
1−
C
N
)S
.
If the rate of corrupt vote counts c is CS where 0 < c < 1, then the chance of selecting
zero corrupt counts in S draws with replacement is (1− c)S for selecting zero corrupt vote
counts. Therefore, the estimated probability for selecting one or more corrupt vote counts
in S draws with replacement is P = 1− (1− c)S .
Beginning with the probability for not detecting any miscount
1− P ≈ (1− c)S
taking the log of both sides
ln(1− P ) ≈ ln(1− c)S
and
ln(1− P ) ≈ −cS
and solving for S gives
S ≈
ln(1− P )
−c
To further improve the estimate for S, we use the formula for estimating the number
of distinct elements, S, in a sample of size t drawn (with replacement) from a set of size N:
S ≈ N(1− e)
−t
N and replace t by our estimate for S above, resulting in
S ≈ N
(
1− e
ln(1−P )
Nc
)
(16)
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(Rivest, 2007; Dopp, 2007b).
Equivalently, because Nc = C, we get
S ≈ N
(
1− e
ln(1−P )
C
)
≈ N
(
1− (eln(1−P ))
1
C
)
≈ N
(
1− (1− P )
1
C
)
,
a simple formula for estimating post-election audit sample sizes to provide at least P prob-
ability for detecting one or more corrupt vote counts in a sample of size S if there are N
total vote counts and C miscounted vote counts.
Then, as seen in Appendix A, we can estimate
C ≈
N(w − r)
k(b+ w − r)
,
S ≈ N
(
1− (1− P )
k(b+w−r)
N(w−r)
)
.
A slightly more exact numerical method for calculating the risk-limiting election audit
sample size S is found by solving the sampling-without-replacement formula, by employing
the detailed estimate for the minimum number of corrupt vote counts, C, using the gammaln
function for evaluating
ln(1− P )− ln[(N − C)!(N − S)!/(N !(N − C − S)!)],
y = ln(1− P ) + gammaln(N − C − S + 1)− gammaln(N − S + 1)
+ gammaln(N + 1)− gammaln(N −C + 1).
via the numerical method of bisections (Dopp & Stenger, 2006).
Appendix C: Double-Checking the Audit Sample Size
Any post-election audit sample size S can be checked to see what minimum probability the
sample size provides for detecting the minimum amount of vote miscount necessary to cause
an incorrect election outcome by using the formula for the probability for drawing one or
more miscounted audit units in a randomly drawn sample of audit units of size S, drawn
without replacement, when there are C corrupt vote counts out of a total of N vote counts.
P = 1−
(
C
0
)(
N−C
S
)
(
N
S
)
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can be calculated in a spreadsheet using the formula 1 - HYPGEOMDIST(0, S, C, N) (See
(Dopp & Baiman, 2005–2006)) This formula for checking the probability that the audit
sample would detect outcome-altering vote miscount may be applied to both fixed rate
audits and to risk-limiting audits.
Appendix D: SomeWeighted Random Sampling & Error Bound
Methods That Do Not Work Well
This appendix points out details of the work of authors who have contributed new ap-
proaches to post-election auditing mathematics and methods that need some improvements.
For instance, the sampling weights recommended for post-election auditing inMachine-
Assisted Election Auditing seem to be incorrect (Calandrino et al., 2007b, pp. 7–8).
Auditors desire a confidence level c that no fraud significant enough to change the
election’s outcome occurred. First the authors’ define their variables:
“. . . let v1, . . . , vn be the electronically reported vote totals for the candidates
in decreasing order. Therefore v1, . . . , vk correspond to winning candidates.
Because a single ballot may contain votes for up to k candidates, we need to
consider the combination of votes on each ballot. Given a ballot, let Cs, where
1 ≤ s ≤ k, be the winning candidate with the lowest vote total that received a
vote on the ballot. (Let Cs be null if the ballot does not contain votes for any
winning candidate.) Let Ct, where k + 1 ≤ t ≤ n, be the losing candidate with
the highest vote total that did not receive a vote on the ballot. (Let hCt be null
if the ballot contains votes for all of the losing candidates.)”
Calandrino et al. continue:
If Cs is non-null, then we need to audit this ballot with probability at least
1 − (1 − c)1/b1 , where b1 = vs − vk+1. Intuitively, one possible result-changing
scenario involving an error in this ballot would be to add vs − vk+1 incorrect
votes for candidate s.
The last sentence of the preceding paragraph is incorrect because the most number of
votes that any single ballot can possibly contribute is k votes, where k is the number of
seats being elected in the contest. Thus the most number of incorrect votes that any one
ballot can contribute is k votes.
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On the other hand, the difference between the initial reported number of votes for any
winning and losing candidate could be in the thousands, a number much larger than the
maximum number of incorrect votes k that any ballot can produce in the initial reports.
In addition, the formula above cannot be generalized to audit units with more than
one ballot and does not seem to reliably produce sensible sampling probabilities.27
Similarly, the audit unit sampling weights recommended by Aslam, Popa, and Rivest
in On Auditing Elections When Precincts Have Different Sizes (Aslam et al., 2008, p. 16)
described by the expression
ei = min(2svi;M ; vi + rij1 −minj rij)
(It is OK just to use the first term, so that ei = 2svi.). . .
Also compute the total error bound:
E =
∑
1≤i≤n ei.
most often result in using the quantity 2svi where s = 0.20 and vi is the number of votes
cast within each audit unit. The quantity 2svi is then used for both the sampling weights
and to calculate the overall error E. Using the quantity 2svi for weighting random selections
is less desirable than weighting random selections by the number of ballots cast within each
audit unit because 2svi does not account for under and over-votes since it uses the quantity
“votes cast” rather than “ballots cast”. Using 2svi rather than the actual upper margin
error bounds will often result in an inadequate sample size and puts too much focus on
auditing ballots that contain votes for losing candidates where not as much margin error
could contribute to causing an incorrect initial outcome.
Figure 7 below shows that the quantity 2svi is most often less than the actual within
audit unit upper margin error bound, thus under-estimating the maximum possible margin
error, increasing the quantity M/E and producing an inadequate sample size. Figure 7 also
shows how 2sv is sometimes impossible because there are not enough votes for the just-
winning candidate in some audit units to contribute 40% margin error. Note that the upper
margin error bounds “b+w− r” and “2w+ r+ other” can be as high as 200% of the total
number of within audit unit ballots while 2sv is always 40% of the total number of ballots.
Note that the actual upper margin error bounds increase as the winning candidate share
increases, and that since the winning candidate normally has more within audit unit vote
share than the losing candidate the 2sv error bound under-estimates the possible margin
error, thus over-estimating the number of audit units needed to cause an incorrect outcome
27pi = 1− (1− c)
1/b1 .
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and under-estimating the post-election audit sample sizes necesssary to detect incorrect
election outcomes.
Figure 3: The 2sv error bounds compared with actual upper margin error bounds for the
“just winning-losing” candidate pair, k(b+w− r), and with the upper margin error bounds
for all “winning-losing” candidate pairs, k(2w+r+other) where k = 2s — plotted by initial
vote share of the just-losing candidate
Despite being an excellent upper error bound for calculating sample sizes, the just-
winning-losing candidate pair bounds, bi + wi − ri, may be incorrect sampling weights. As
a sampling weight the just-winning-losing candidate pair bounds could increase the chance
for certain election rigging strategies to prevail under some circumstances.
Appendix E: The just-winning-losing candidate pair bounds
produce the largest sample size
PROOF that using the winning-losing candidate pair with the smallest margin produces
the most conservative (largest) post-election audit sample size:
Clearly (w−r) ≤ (w− l) where l is the number of votes for any initial losing candidate.
So take any losing candidate with a greater margin than the runner-up and his margin can
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be expressed as w − r + y where y > 0. Now compare the ratio (Mr/Er) of the runner-up
and any other initial losing candidate.
We want to compare
Mr
Er
=
w − r
b+ w − r
and
Ml
El
=
w − (r − y)
b+ w − (r − y)
to see which is bigger.
For simplicity, let w − r = x so we compare
Mr
Er
=
x
b+ x
and
Ml
El
=
x+ y
b+ x+ y
Multiplying both fractions top and bottom by the necessary factors to get a common de-
nominator and comparing numerators we get
xb+ x2 + xy ≤ xb+ x2 + xy + by
so that
Mr
Er
≤
Ml
El
Q.E.D.
Appendix F: Example of maximum all candidate-pair margin
error bound
If 200 ballots are cast in a precinct, and all four candidates — two apparent winners and
two apparent losers — initially receive 50 votes apiece, the within audit unit upper margin
error bound for all winning-losing pairs is 2w+ l = b+w = 2(100)+100 = 300 votes where
w is the number of votes counted for initial winners and l is the number of all other ballots,
and b is the number of total ballots cast.
This appendix shows one way out of the twelve possible ways that the maximum 300
vote margin error can occur in this particular situation.
One way that the maximum 300 vote margin error can occur is to assume that can-
didates A & B are the initially, but incorrectly, reported winners, and that candidates C
& D are the initially incorrectly reported losers. Given this scenario there are two possible
scenarios that result in a 300 vote margin error.
Eg. Miscount the initial votes as follows in this precinct.
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1. The 50 votes for candidate A should really have been counted for candidate C, causing
a 100 vote margin error for the pair A & C.
2. The 50 votes for candidate D should really have gone to candidate C, causing a 50
vote margin error for the pair A & C.
3. The 50 votes counted for candidate B should really have been counted for candidate
D, causing a 100 vote margin error for the pair B & D.
4. The 50 votes counted for candidate C should really have been counted for candidate
D, causing a 50 vote margin error for candidate pair B & D.
These errors add up to a 300 vote margin error for this scenario.
For each of the 6 possible pairs of winners and losers possible for this reviewer’s scenario,
there are 2 such examples of a 300 vote margin error, for 12 total examples of how a 300
vote margin error can occur.
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Appendix G: Example of risk-limiting audit sampling methods
in a close-margin election contest
The tables below shows an example applying the margin error bounds and improved meth-
ods presented in this article to the election data for the close-margin 2004 Utah State Senate
District # 1 election contest.
46
Example Upper Margin Error Bounds in a Narrow Margin Contest
2004 Utah State Senate, Dist # 1 Vote Counts Upper Margin Error Bnds
Precinct #Ballots Fife Evans Jenkins Just-
winning/just-
losing candidate
margin error
bnds
All candidate
pair margin
error bnds
Totals 16,987 7,981 7,553 463 338 16,859 24,412
SL2004 574 296 233 17 7 637 870
SL2052 518 262 191 12 5 589 780
SL1308 536 266 226 22 11 576 802
SL2034 572 269 275 8 4 566 841
SL2226 486 260 184 9 16 562 746
SL2056 518 252 212 23 9 558 770
SL2006 597 247 293 12 12 551 844
SL2030 545 254 260 8 13 539 799
SL2214 407 238 138 9 6 507 645
SL2008 453 228 186 16 10 495 681
SL2224 377 237 119 9 2 495 614
SL1216 499 225 232 13 12 492 724
SL2049 521 224 258 19 5 487 745
SL1214 562 220 300 12 8 482 782
SL2242 440 219 189 12 4 470 659
SL2036 517 208 272 9 10 453 725
SL1306 458 199 215 9 18 442 657
SL2206 333 204 102 9 13 435 537
SL2014 392 206 165 12 3 433 598
SL2252 346 200 116 9 5 430 546
SL1302 466 193 231 14 10 428 659
SL1327 455 190 227 14 10 418 645
SL2003 378 198 159 8 3 417 576
SL2222 383 192 159 7 10 416 575
SL2246 372 194 150 6 11 416 566
SL1218 374 177 147 12 21 404 551
SL1328 378 182 168 9 8 392 560
SL2038 290 170 86 14 1 374 460
SL2254 315 167 117 12 0 365 482
SL2007 454 162 267 7 8 349 616
SL2002 332 160 153 7 4 339 492
SL1320 411 148 229 13 7 330 559
SL2204 256 148 86 6 8 318 404
SL1322 321 137 142 15 11 316 458
SL1350 341 129 172 17 12 298 470
SL1346 347 133 190 8 8 290 480
SL1210 256 116 114 8 3 258 372
SL1303 343 105 199 7 9 249 448
SL2050 287 104 153 15 7 238 391
SL2053 196 108 67 6 3 237 304
SL1351 253 85 132 9 8 206 338
SL2001 73 42 25 0 1 90 115
SL2216 44 27 14 0 2 57 71
Table 8: The election data and margin error bounds for the 2004 Utah State Senate District
# 1 narrow-margin contest shown above are used in Tables 7 and 7 to demonstrate the four
improved methods for calculating risk-limiting post-election audit sample sizes presented in
this paper.
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Example # 2 of the Improved Uniform Method & New Uniform Estimation Method
Uniform Sampling Method Uniform Estimation Method
Sample Size 40 —c— 35 ≈ S ≤ 40
min #corrupt AUs 2 2 ≤ C ≈ 3
Precinct kui cumulative margin error
SL
SL2004 254.8 254.8
SL2052 235.6 490.4
SL1308 230.4
SL2034 226.4
SL2226 224.8
SL2056 223.2
SL2006 220.4
SL2030 215.6
SL2214 202.8
SL2008 198
SL2224 198
SL1216 196.8
SL2049 194.8
SL1214 192.8
SL2242 188
SL2036 181.2
SL1306 176.8
SL2206 174
SL2014 173.2
SL2252 172
SL1302 171.2
SL1327 167.2
SL2003 166.8
SL2222 166.4
SL2246 166.4
SL1218 161.6
SL1328 156.8
SL2038 149.6
SL2254 146
SL2007 139.6
SL2002 135.6
SL1320 132
SL2204 127.2
SL1322 126.4
SL1350 119.2
SL1346 116
SL1210 103.2
SL1303 99.6
SL2050 95.2
SL2053 94.8
SL1351 82.4
SL2001 36
SL2216 22.8
SL2005 0
Table 9: This table shows the improved and new uniform sampling calculations for the
2004 Utah State Senate District # 1 narrow-margin contest (Data shown in Table 7). The
confidence probability is P = 0.99 and the maximum level of undetectability is k = 0.4.
The prior unimproved uniform method using 2svi error bounds calculates a significantly
smaller sample size of 34 audit units for this contest because it under-estimates the within
audit unit maximum margin error that could occur within each audit unit.
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Example # 2 applying the Improved Weighted Sampling Methods
Improved PPMEB approach Improved PPMEBWR approach
Expected Sample Size 40 34
#Draws 3
Precinct ci pi pi 1− (1 − p)t
SL2004 0.98 0.99 - 0.03 0.92
SL2052 1.10 0.98 - 0.03 0.90
SL1308 1.07 0.99 - 0.03 0.91
SL2034 1.02 0.99 - 0.03 0.92
SL2226 1.15 0.98 - 0.03 0.89
SL2056 1.11 0.98 - 0.03 0.90
SL2006 1.01 0.99 - 0.03 0.92
SL2030 1.07 0.99 - 0.03 0.91
SL2214 1.33 0.97 - 0.03 0.85
SL2008 1.26 0.97 - 0.03 0.87
SL2224 1.39 0.96 - 0.02 0.84
SL1216 1.18 0.98 - 0.03 0.88
SL2049 1.15 0.98 - 0.03 0.89
SL1214 1.09 0.99 - 0.03 0.90
SL2242 1.30 0.97 - 0.03 0.86
SL2036 1.18 0.98 - 0.03 0.88
SL1306 1.30 0.97 - 0.03 0.86
SL2206 1.59 0.94 - 0.02 0.80
SL2014 1.43 0.96 - 0.02 0.83
SL2252 1.57 0.95 - 0.02 0.80
SL1302 1.30 0.97 - 0.03 0.86
SL1327 1.33 0.97 - 0.03 0.85
SL2003 1.49 0.95 - 0.02 0.82
SL2222 1.49 0.95 - 0.02 0.82
SL2246 1.51 0.95 - 0.02 0.81
SL1218 1.55 0.95 - 0.02 0.80
SL1328 1.53 0.95 - 0.02 0.81
SL2038 1.86 0.92 - 0.02 0.74
SL2254 1.78 0.93 - 0.02 0.76
SL2007 1.39 0.96 - 0.02 0.84
SL2002 1.74 0.93 - 0.02 0.77
SL1320 1.53 0.95 - 0.02 0.81
SL2204 2.12 0.89 - 0.02 0.70
SL1322 1.87 0.91 - 0.02 0.74
SL1350 1.82 0.92 - 0.02 0.75
SL1346 1.78 0.92 - 0.02 0.76
SL1210 2.30 0.86 - 0.01 0.67
SL1303 1.91 0.91 - 0.02 0.73
SL2050 2.19 0.88 - 0.02 0.68
SL2053 2.82 0.81 - 0.01 0.59
SL1351 2.53 0.84 - 0.01 0.63
SL2001 7.44 0.46 - 0.00 0.29
SL2216 12.06 0.32 - 0.00 0.19
Table 10: This table shows two improved weighted sampling methods for risk-limiting post-
election audits applied to the 2004 Utah State Senate District # 1 narrow-margin contest
(data shown in Table 7). This example uses a confidence probability of P = 0.99 and
a maximum level of undetectability of k = 0.4. In this case, the improved PPMEBWR
method shows an expected sample size of 34 audit units versus the old PPMEBR method
using the 2sv error bound that would calculate a slightly smaller sample size of 33 audit
units. The improved PPMEB method is more conservative than the improved PPMEBWR
method with an expected sample size of 40 audit units.
49
References
Appel, Andrew W. 1997 (Mar.). Effective audit policy for voter-verified paper
ballots in New Jersey. Princeton Computer Science Department Web site.
http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/papers/appel-nj-audits.pdf.
Aslam, Javed A., Popa, Raluca A., & Rivest, Ronald L. 2007. On estimating the
size and confidence of a statistical audit. In: Proceedings of the Electronic Vot-
ing Technology Workshop (EVT’07), August 6, 2007, Boston, MA. Berkeley,
CA, USA: USENIX Association. http://www.usenix.org/events/evt07/tech/,
http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/AslamPopaRivest-OnEstimatingTheSizeAndConfidenceOfAStatisticalAudit.pdf.
Aslam, Javed A., Popa, Raluca A., & Rivest, Ronald L. 2008 (Jan.). On auditing elections
when precincts have different sizes. Massachusetts Institute of Technology Web site.
http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/AslamPopaRivest-OnAuditingElectionsWhenPrecinctsHaveDifferentSizes.pdf.
Atkeson, Lonna Rae, Alvarez, R. Michael, & Hall, Thad E. 2008 (Sept.). The New
Mexico 2006 Post Election Audit Report. Pew Center on the States Web site.
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/NM_Audit_Report1.pdf.
Burr, Bill. 2007 (May). Introduction & VVPR. In: Technical Guidelines Development
Committee, May 21-22, 2007, Plenary Meeting, Computer Security Division of NIST.
http://vote.nist.gov/meeting-05212007/Burr-VVPR.pdf.
Burr, W., Kelsey, J., Peralta, R., & Wack, J. 2006 (Dec.). Requiring software independence
in VVSG 2007: STS Recommendations for the TGDC Technical Guidelines Devel-
opment Committee for the EAC. National Institute of Standards and Technology.
http://vote.nist.gov/DraftWhitePaperOnSIinVVSG2007-20061120.pdf.
Calandrino, Joseph A., Halderman, J. Alex, & Felten, Edward W. 2007a
(Aug.). In defense of pseudorandom sample selection. Center for In-
formation Technology Policy and Dept. of Computer Science, Princeton
University Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs.
http://www.usenix.org/event/evt08/tech/full_papers/calandrino/calandrino_html/.
Calandrino, Joseph A., Halderman, J. Alex, & Felten, Edward W. 2007b (Aug.). Machine-
assisted election auditing. Center for Information Technology Policy and Dept. of
Computer Science, Princeton University Woodrow Wilson School of Public and In-
ternational Affairs. http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/voting/audit07full.pdf.
50
Cordero, Arel, Wagner, David, & Dill, David. 2006 (June). The role of
dice in election audits. University of California at Berkeley Web site.
http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~daw/papers/dice-wote06.pdf.
Democracy, Center For, & Management, Election. 2005 (Sept.). Building confidence in
US elections — Report of the Commission on Federal Election Reform. American
University. http://www.american.edu/ia/cfer/report/full_report.pdf.
Deputy Secretary of State Anthony Stevens. 2007. Hand counting using on-
going verification. Office of the Secretary of State of New Hampshire.
http://utahcountvotes.org/legislature/NH-Manual-Counting/Hand-Counting-and-Ongoing-Verification.ppt.
Dill, David. 2005 (Apr.). David dill’s testimony before the Commission
on Federal Election Reform (The Carter–Baker Commission), Ameri-
can University, Washington, DC. Verified Voting Foundation Web site.
http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?id=5987.
Dopp, Kathy. 2007a (May). First US scientific election audit reveals voting system
flaws but questions remain unanswered — critique of the collaborative public au-
dit of Cuyahoga County Ohio, November 2006 election. US Count Votes Web site.
http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/OH/CuyahogaElectionAudit.pdf.
Dopp, Kathy. 2007b (Jan.). How big should an election audit be? Fixed
rate audits do not work for elections. US Count Votes Web site.
http://electionmathematics.org//ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/ElectionAuditEstimator.pdf.
Dopp, Kathy. 2007–2008a (Dec.). Derivation of the formula for the number of se-
lection rounds for the probability proportional to margin error bound (PPMEB)
method for determining samples for vote count audits. US Count Votes Web site.
http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/PPMEB-Auditing.pdf.
Dopp, Kathy. 2007–2008b (Oct.). The history of confidence election auditing development
(1975 to 2008) & overview of election auditing fundamentals. US Count Votes Web site.
http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/History-of-Election-Auditing-Development.pdf.
Dopp, Kathy. 2007–2008c (Feb.). Post-election vote count audits — probability pro-
portional to margin error bound (PPMEB) method. US Count Votes Web site.
http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/VoteCountAudits-PPMEB.pdf.
51
Dopp, Kathy. 2008 (Feb.). Critique of the post-election auditing recommendations of
Verified Voting and the American Statistical Association. US Count Votes Web site.
http://electionmathematics.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/Critique-McCarthy-NJ-Audits.pdf.
Dopp, Kathy. 2009 (Mar.). Checking the accuracy of election outcomes — post-election
audit procedures. not published yet.
Dopp, Kathy, & Baiman, Ron. 2005–2006 (June). How can independent
paper audits ensure election integrity? US Count Votes Web site.
http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/Paper_Audits.pdf.
Dopp, Kathy, & Stenger, Frank. 2006 (Sept.). The election integrity audit. US Count Votes
Web site. http://vote.nist.gov/ElectionIntegrityAudit.pdf.
Dopp, Kathy, & Straight, Joycelynn. 2006–2008. Mandatory vote count audit — A
legislative & administrative proposal. US Count Votes and Utah Count Votes Web site.
http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/legislative/VoteCountAuditBillRequest.pdf.
Hall, Joseph. 2008a (Mar.). Dice binning calculator for post-election audits. Web site.
http://www.josephhall.org/dicebins.php.
Hall, Joseph. 2008b (Dec.). Policy mechanisms for increasing transparency
in electronic voting. Ph.D. thesis, University of California at Berkeley.
http://josephhall.org/papers/jhall-phd.pdf.
Hall, Joseph Lorenzo, Miratrix, Luke W., Stark, Philip B., Briones, Melvin, Ginnold, Elaine,
Oakley, Freddie, Peaden, Martin, Pellerin, Gail, tom Stanionis, & Webber, Tricia.
2009 (July). Implementing risk-limiting post-election audits in california. Web site.
http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/0905/0905.4691v3.pdf.
Jones, Douglas W. 2004. Auditing elections. Communications of the
acm, 47(10), 46–50. http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1022594.1022622
http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/cacm2004.shtml.
McBurnett, Neal. 2008. CO election auditing project — auditable re-
ports for Hart Intercivic and Hart CCOS machines). Web site.
http://bcn.boulder.co.us/~neal/elections/boulder-audit-08-11/.
Contains links to programs to calculate the sample size, and
randomly select the sample and the contests to audit at
52
http://bazaar.launchpad.net/~nealmcb/electionaudits/trunk/files,
http://bcn.boulder.co.us/~neal/electionaudits/.
McCarthy, John, Stanislevic, Howard, Lindeman, Mark, Ash, Arlene, Ad-
dona, Vittorio, & Batcher, Mary. 2007 (Nov.). Percentage-based vs.
SAFE vote tabulation auditing: A graphic comparison. Web site.
http://electionaudits.org/files/Percentage-based%20vs%20SAFE%20Vote%%20Tabulation%20Auditing%20Paper.pdf.
Mebane, Jr., Walter R., Sekhon, Jasjeet S., & Wand, Jonathan. 2003 (Oct.).
Detecting and correcting election irregularities. Stanford University Web site.
http://wand.stanford.edu/research/detecting.pdf.
Neff, C. Andrew. 2003 (Dec.). Election confidence — A comparison of
methodologies and their relative effectiveness at achieving it. Web site.
http://www.electionmathematics.org/em-audits/US/Neff-ElectionConfidence.pdf.
NIST staff. 2007. Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, recommendations to
the Election Assistance Commission, August 2007. Prepared at the re-
quest of the Technical Guidelines Development Committee. NIST Web
site. http://vote.nist.gov/DraftWhitePaperOnSIinVVSG2007-20061120.pdf
http://vote.nist.gov/VVSG-0807/Final-TGDC-VVSG-08312007.pdf.
Norden, Lawrence, Burstein, Aaron, Hall, Joseph Lorenzo, & Chen, Margaret. 2007a
(Aug.). Post-election audits: Restoring trust in elections. Brennan Cen-
ter for Justice with the Samuelson Law, Technology & Public Policy Clinic.
http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/download_file_50227.pdf
Executive Summary http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/download_file_50228.pdf
http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/download_file_50109.pdf.
Norden, Lawrence, Burstein, Aaron, Hall, Joseph Lorenzo, Dill, David, Hoke, Can-
dice, Mebane, Jr., Walter, Oakley, Freddie, Rivest, Ronald L., & Wagner, David.
2007b (Feb.). Thoughts on mandatory audits. The Brennan Center Web site.
http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/download_file_47860.pdf.
Project ACCURATE. 2005 (Sept.). Public comment on the 2005 Voluntary Voting Sys-
tem Guidelines. Submitted to the United States Election Assistance Commission,
Samuelson Law, Technology & Public Policy Clinic, University of California, Berkeley.
http://accurate-voting.org/accurate/docs/2005_vvsg_comment.pdf.
53
Rivest, Ronald L. 2007 (Nov.). A simple rule of thumb
for election audit size determination. MIT Web site.
http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/Rivest-ASimpleRuleOfThumbForElectionAuditSizeDetermination.pdf.
Rivest, Ronald L. 2008 (Apr.). A Sum of Square Roots (SSR) pseu-
dorandom sampling method for election audits. MIT Web site.
http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/Rivest-ASumOfSquareRootsSSRPseudorandomSamplingMethodForElectionAudits.pdf.
Rivest, Ronald L., & Wack, John P. 2006 (July). On the notion of “software independence”
in voting systems. NIST Web site. http://vote.nist.gov/SI-in-voting.pdf.
Saltman, Roy G. 1975 (Mar.). Effective use of computing technology in vote-tallying. Tech-
nical Report NBSIR 75–687. National Bureau of Standards, Information Technology
Division. http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/NBS_SP_500-30.pdf.
Stanislevic, Howard. 2006. Random auditing of E-voting systems: How much is enough?
http://www.votetrustusa.org/pdfs/VTTF/EVEPAuditing.pdf.
Stark, Philip B. 2008a (Aug.). CAST: Canvass Audit by Sampling and
Testing. Department of Statistics, University of California, Berkeley.
http://statistics.berkeley.edu/~stark/Preprints/cast08.pdf and
http://www.stat.berkeley.edu/~stark/Seminars/ksu08.pdf.
Stark, Philip B. 2008b. Conservative statistical post-election au-
dits. The annals of applied statistics, 2(2), 550–581.
http://statistics.berkeley.edu/~stark/Preprints/conservativeElectionAudits07.pdf.
Stark, Philip B. 2008c. Election audits by sampling with probability proportional to an error
bound: dealing with discrepancies. Department of Statistics, University of California,
Berkeley. http://statistics.berkeley.edu/~stark/Preprints/ppebwrwd08.pdf.
Stark, Philip B. 2008d. A sharper discrepancy measure for post-
election audits. The annals of applied statistics, 2(3), 982–985.
http://statistics.berkeley.edu/~stark/Preprints/pairwise08.pdf.
Stark, Philip B. 2009a (May). Auditing a collection of races simultane-
ously. Department of Statistics, University of California, Berkeley.
http://www.stat.berkeley.edu/~stark/Preprints/simultaneous09.pdf.
54
Stark, Philip B. 2009b (Feb.). Risk-limiting post-election audits: P-values from common
probability inequalities. Department of Statistics, University of California, Berkeley.
http://www.stat.berkeley.edu/~stark/Preprints/pvalues09.pdf.
The Collaborative Audit Committee. 2007 (Apr.). Collaborative pub-
lic audit of the November 2006 General Election. Center for
Election Integrity for the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections.
http://electionmathematics.org/em-audits/OH/2006Audit/cuyahoga_audit_report.pdf.
The Election Audits Task Force. 2009 (Jan.). Report on election auditing.
http://www.lwv.org/Content/ContentGroups/Membership/ProjectsTaskforces/Report_ElectionAudits.pdf.
US General Accounting Office. 2005. Federal efforts to improve security and reliability of
electronic voting systems are under way, but key activities need to be completed. US
GAO Web site. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05956.pdf.
Walmsley, Paul. 2005. Requirements for statistical live auditing of optical-scan
and VVPAT records — and for live auditing for vote tabulation. Web site.
http://www.booyaka.com/~paul/ea/eac-20050930/live-audit-overview.txt
http://www.booyaka.com/~paul/ea/eac-20050930/interpretation-live-audit.txt
http://www.booyaka.com/~paul/ea/eac-20050930/tabulation-live-audit.txt.
Wand, Jonathan. 2004. Auditing an election using sampling: The impact of
bin size on the probability of detecting manipulation. Stanford Web site.
http://wand.stanford.edu/elections/probability.pdf.
55
